Joseph F. Merrill v. Bailey & Sons Company; Seymour N. Bailey and Emma Z. Bailey; J. W. Summerhays & Sons Company; Colorado Animal By-Products Company; Leona B. Whitehill; Robert Bailey Whitehill; C. E. Summerhays; J. J. Summerhays; and John Snowcroft & Sons Company : Reply Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1940
Joseph F. Merrill v. Bailey & Sons Company;
Seymour N. Bailey and Emma Z. Bailey; J. W.
Summerhays & Sons Company; Colorado Animal
By-Products Company; Leona B. Whitehill; Robert
Bailey Whitehill; C. E. Summerhays; J. J.
Summerhays; and John Snowcroft & Sons
Company : Reply Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hurd & Hurd; Moyle, Richards & McKay; Judd, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorneys for Appellants;
J. D. Skeen; E. J. Skeen; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Merrill v. Bailey & Sons Company et al, No. 6219 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/607
E;2.19 
No. 6219-
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JosEPH F. :MERRILL, 
Plari·ntiff' and Respondent, 
vs. 
BAILEY & SoNs CoMPANY, a cor-
poration; SEYMOUR N. BAILEY, 
and EMl\IA Z. BAILEY, his -vvife; 
J. vV. SuMMERHAYS & SoNs CoM-
PANY, a eorporation; CoLORADo 
ANIMAL BY-PRODUCTS rCOMPANY, 
a corporation ; LEoN A B. W HLTE-
HILL, adn1inistratrix of the 
Estate of Bert N. Bailey, De-
ceased; HOBERT BAILEY vV RITE-
HILL; C. E. SuMMERHAYS and 
J. J. SuMMERHAYS, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
JoHN ScowcROFT & SoNs CoM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defenda.nt not appealimg. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL D]jSTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE CouNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HoN. P. C. EvANs, JuDGE. 
HuRD & HuRD, 
1\foYLE, HrcHARDs & McKAY, 
JUDD, HAY, QuiNNEY & NEBEKER, 
F IttpeysE~ts. J. D. SKEEN and L , L~J E .. J. SKEEN, ..fl. . . ' • 
Attorneys for RespblJibJt.· ·, tJ4-0 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOSEPH F. :MERRILL, 
Plaintiff and Responden~t, 
vs. 
BAILEY & SoNs CoMPANY, a cor-
poration; SEYMOUR N. BAILEY, 
and EMMA Z. BAILEY, his wife; 
J. W. SuMMERHAYS & SoNs CoM-
PANY, a corporation; CoLORADO 
ANIMAL BY-PRoDUCTS 'CoMPANY, 
a corporatio!n; LEONA B. WHITE-
HILL, administratrix of the 
Estate of Bert N. Bailey, De-
ceased; RoBERT BAILEY WRITE-
HILL; .C. E. 8uMMERHAYs and 
J. J. 8UMMERHAYS, 
Defernda.nts GJnd Appellants, 
JoHN ScowcRoFT & SoNs CoM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant not appealing. 
No. 6219 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
With leave of court we submit briefly appellants' 
re.p1y to certain contentions made by respondent in his 
brief and upon the oral argument. 
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At the risk of some repetition \Ve believe it will ibe 
helpful to reset some of the historical background 
against Wlhich the problem must be viewed. It will be 
remembered that respondent's property rights in the 
s·outh half of Lot 3 are immedirutely north of appellants' 
property, which is in Lot 2. Titles of respondent and 
appellants all ·came from a -common grantor. When 
title to the south half of Lot 3 and Lot 2 was in the same 
owner substantial improvements were made· upom Lot 
2. Such improvements came to the north line of Lot 2 
so that the full enjoyment of the same ·could be had only 
by using a portion of the ·s-outh half of Lot 3 for pur-
poses of ingress and egres·s. A spur track was necessary 
to give re~al value :to the buildings on Lot 2. Such a track 
necessarily had to o'Ccupy a portion of the s-outh half of 
Lot 3. Such a spur wa!S ~built and of course it approached 
the buildings to be served upon a cure. In order to 
make the the curved track serve the buildings in the 
manner in WJhich it must have been untended, it was nec-
essary tu build a -curved platform to make contact be-
tween railroad ~cars and the buildings. 
Having spent the money to improve Lot 2 and having 
provided the means of access to such improvements over 
Lot 3 it is certainly most unlikely that the common owner 
would sell the south half of Lot 3 upon such terms as to 
impair the easements which had been established and 
reserved and thereby seriously depreciate the value of 
the improvements upon Lot 2. 
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Con~istent "·ith wha1t one might reasonably expect, 
such use was made ·of the south haH of Lot 3 as to give 
a maximum value to Lot 2. Accordingly, when Seymour 
Bailey deeded his one-half interest in the south half of 
Lot 3 to his brother, Bert, lhe quite naturally inserted 
in the deed the follow1n:g reservation: 
"Reserving, however, to the grantors the perpe-
tual right to the maintenance and use of the 
plartJorm now lo~ated on the Southern portion 
of said premises about 10 feet wide including 
the over-lapping roof for said platform i~n­
cluding also the curve thereof along the rail-
way spur as at present -constructed, with full 
right to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the 
same within its present location. 
''Also reserving the perpetual R.ight to the use 
of the trackage over :and .along the South line 
of said premises (·and to the premises) a,nd of 
the team, truck -or auto drive along the said 
tra'Ck, all Ito be used in eonneetion and for the 
convenience of Lot 2, of ·said Block for the 
loading and unloading of mercha,ndise. 
"It is als-o ;hereby agreed that without the con-
sent of Grantor, Seymour N. Bailey, or his 
assigns, that no right shall be granted for the 
use of said railway spur beyond the East end 
of said Lot 3. '' 
The language in rl:he reservatinn second above quoted 
appears in the abstract of title CE·x. X)_ at page 23 exact-
ly .as set out above, but a check of the record in the Coun-
ty Recorder's office of Sallt ·Lake County revea.l·s that the 
words ''and to the premises'' in brackets above are not 
in the reservations as recorded, and it is, therefore, ap-
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parent that the· abstracter i'n eopying the record from 
the Recorder's office must have made a typographical 
error and inserlted the words ''and to the premises'' by 
mistake, but the fact still remains that plaintiff in his 
reply admitted defendants' allegation of the reservation 
in this language, and EJGhibit X is the only abstract which 
was received in evidence. The record from the County 
Recorder's ·office was not offered in evidence, and so far 
as concerns the record in the trial court and before this 
Court, the words '' a1nd to the premises" are in the re-
se-rvations, and the findings of the trial -court are in fa:ct 
''false to' the record'' as made on (the trial of this action 
because the onJy evidence before the Court as to the ex-
act language of the reservation was the a:bstract of the 
rights of way, Exhibit X. 
But regardless of whether the words ''and Ito the 
premises'' are in the re'Servation or mot, it should be noted 
that it is re.cited that the rig,hts of way and other ease-
ments and righits reserved were ·''all to be used in con-
nection and for the convenience of Lot 2'', which clearly 
shows that the intent .and purpose was to reserve the 
same rights and uses theretofore exercised lin order to 
preserve and maintain the value of Lot 2. The south! 
half of Lot 3 had heen impressed with uses for the bene-
fit of Lot 2 and the broad easement ''for the convenience 
of Lot ·2" was for the purpose ·Of continuing that use. 
Similarly, when Seymour and Bert Bailey conveyed 
to Bailey & Sons Company lthey were jealous of the 
rights of Lot 3, whjeh were neces'Sary to maintain the 
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value of Lot 2. By that instrument .o.f conveyance there 
was granted an easement as follows: 
''together with the ttracka.ge privilege now in use 
at the North end of said property. ·* * * 
"* * * Also a perpetual Right to the use of 
the railroad spur together with the team, 
truck and auto drive along the North line 
thereof and the platfomn for loading and un-
loading from vehicles and .cars, through and 
over a part of the South lf2 of ·Lot 3, of said 
Block and Plat as at present constituted, with 
a Right to repair, reconstruCJt or rebui1d the 
same as shall from time to time become nec-
essary within its present location.'' 
Respondent would restrict the easements reserved 
and granfed in two particulars to which we desire to 
there addres·s ourselves. First, it is contended that no 
easement exists which g[ves a·ppellants any rights north 
of the spur track and that if any :such right exiSJts it is 
for the exclusive benefit of one parcel of land in Lot 2. 
Counsel for respondent would have you believe that the 
team track or truck drive north of the spur wa·s employed 
and used only for approach to an .ancient hay barn in 
Lot 3 (see appellants' brief, page 13). Such contention 
is i)n ·Confli.ct with the dear and uncontradi·cted evidence 
and with the definite and unamlbiguous language of the 
deeds referred to. It ·was testified by the witness Ryser 
that he had been secretary of Bailey & 8ons Company 
continuously from 1the year 1914 to and including the 
trial, a. matter of more tham. twenty years; that he had 
seen the premises involved in this suit throughout that 
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long pe~iod and was entirely familiar with the his~ory 
thereof and the uses made ·Of the property. Speaking 
of the team or truck track referred to in the easement 
Ryser stated that througholl!t the years it was the uni-
form habit of teamsters and truck drivers to drive in 
the south baH of Lot 3 on the truck track referred to a~1d 
from that poii1Jt to back across the spur track to the 
north to and against the platform for loading and un-
loading of n1erchandise to and from the buildings in Lot 
2 (Ab. 94, 9r5, 99). 
To the same effect .is the testimony of vVilliam I. 
Richards, who has been in the employ of Bailey & Sons 
~continuously from the year 1910 until 1the time of the 
trial. During that time he was for fifteen years ware-
house foreman; he had the closest acquaintance and 
familiarity with the property involved and throughout 
the years had ~seen and observed the use made of the 
south half of Lot 3 in relation to Lot 2 and the buildings 
located thereon. Speaking of the use of the concrete 
team track, :Mr. Richards made the following statement 
which stands in the record unc.ontradicted: 
''We used the team track in driving teams and 
later trucks into the front of the Globe Mills 
~building .and out again. The use of the area 
marked on Exhibit '7', 'concrete team track', 
has continued from 1910 right up to the pre-
sent time. It is still used to drive trucks in 
there to turn around and to load and unload 
from the box cars. 
''We used practically all of the South half of Lot 
3 in pulling ·Our teams in, backing up to the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
platforms, and in our other operations. The 
major portion of the area to' the north of the 
railroad spur track has been used for turm-
li:ng the teams and truoks around and backing 
them into the platform and ~cars. We used 
all of the area west of the old original wood 
platform in backing the teams .and trucks up 
to the platform. We would put in two wagons 
from the ·west, ome from the north in the 
jog and we could spot more wagons along the 
track to the north. The area to the west 
and north of the 10 foot jog was all used in 
pulling the trucks and wagons in. T,ha t area 
is being used today iby wagons or trucks driv-
ing across it and has been so used all the time 
since 19110. '' (Ab. 109-110) 
The testimony of the witnesses Ryser and Richards 
is not only not disputed in the record but is .corroborated 
by the testimony of respondent '·s witnes·ses. That the 
concrete driveway referred to is morth of the- spur track 
and that it was used throughout all the years from 1910 
until the t}me of the trial for convenience in backing 
teams and trucks against the platform for loading and 
unloading is without dispute. 
The easememt above referred to des~cribes the right 
of way as a "perpetual right to the use of the railroad 
spur together with the team, truck and auto drive along 
the north line thereof.'' Counsel would have us helieve 
that the parties intended to use the word "south" rather 
than the word ·''north'' in the above description. They 
say that the roadway referred to is south of the tra0ks 
but it would take more than a distortion of the language 
above quoted to indicate anything other than an inten-
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tion to describe a spur track and a driveway north of 
suc.h spur track. 
Furthermore, there never was and is no room for a 
driveway south of the spur track. It is undisputed that 
the common grantors of the parties prior to 1'914, pavea 
with concrete a driveway about 10 to 12 feet wide along 
the north line or side of the spur track and following the 
curve thereof from the place where the spur now crosses 
the 'City ·sidewalk pr.aduca.lly the full length of the spur, 
and with a paved turn-around in front .of the Globe 
Mills building, and which .paved driveway and turn-
aroUJnd still exists and is still in use upon the ground 
today just as it has been for more than thirty years. 
After having constructed and paved a driveway along 
the north line of the spur for the express purp.ose of en-
aibling trucks and vehicles to conveniently load and un-
load to and from the platforms adjoining their ware-
houses on Lot 2, as well as to and from box cars on the 
spur, it is preposterous to .claim, as counsel now attempts 
to, that the common gra1ntor.s of the parties did not refer 
to this paved driveway when they reserved and granted, 
for the benerfit of their warehouse property in Lot 2, 
a ''perpetual flight to the use of the railroad spur, to-
gether with the team, truck and auto drive along the 
north line thereof, etc.'', but instead referred to the area 
south of the spur where there never was and is no room 
for a drive·way either along the line of the spur or else-
where on that side of the spur. 
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But counsel says eYen if appellants are ·correct in 
respect to the truck or auto drive north of the spur track, 
still such easement is not for the benefit of all of Lot 2, 
but only for a s1nall parcel thereof standing presently in 
the name of Sun1merhays. Even if this -contention of 
respondent were correct, the judgment of the trial court 
would have to fall because the trial ·Court has deprived 
all appellants of any rights whatsoever north of the spur 
track. It is perfectly plain that error has been com-
mitted in this particular. But it is by no means admitted 
that the auto drive north of the spur track constitutes 
an easement only for the benefit of one parcel in Lot 2. 
The original easement described the reservation as for 
the convenience of Lot 2. The use made of the track or 
driveway has always been for the use of Lot 2 and the 
whole thereof and a restriction of that benefit to a single 
parcel in Lot 2 would be a derogation of the language 
of the reservation and grants themselves and the unin-
terrupted interpretation of those grants as evidenced by 
the use made of the driveway throughout all the years 
since 1910. 
Counsel stoutly asserts that by the easement con-
tained in the deed from Seymour N. Bailey to Bert N. 
Bailey the platform involved in this case was limited 
to a width of ten feet. Such a conclusion is not sup-
ported either by the language of the easement or by the 
other evidence in the record. It is true that the platform 
is referred to in the deed as being about ten feet wide 
but one must read further to learn the true nature of the 
platform. Witness the language: "reserving, however, 
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to the grantors the perpetual right to the maintenance 
and use of the platform now located ~on the southern 
portion of said premises about ten feet wide including 
the over-lapping roof for said platform including also 
the cu,rve thereof along the spur as at present con-
structed." It will be noted that the platform was de-
scribed as ten feet wide but there was also reserved the 
curve thereof. What was plainly intended was to describe 
a ·curved platform which would be ten feet wide if the 
curve were eliminated. The spur tra-ck would have been 
useless to the property which it was intended to serve 
unless contact were made between the spur and the build-
ings. In order to bring the railroad and the buildings 
into contact it was apparently necessary to build a plat-
form which was ten feet wide on the tangent and which 
curved with the curve of the spur track, becoming wider 
constantly as the spur track curved to the north. That 
the parties never intended to reserve an easement for 
a platform in the form of a parallelogram 10 x 75 feet 
is not only made perfectly clear by the reservation itself 
but by all of the witnesses who testified. So clearly has 
this been made, in fact, that even respondent has at-
tached to his brief for illustrative purposes a map which 
shows that the platform must have been wider than ten 
feet from its western extremity eastward, at least until 
the point 'vas reached where the curve of the spur track 
straightened into a tangent. 
According to respondent's own witnesses, ~now 
and Evans, the platform was at least thirty feet wide 
opposite the west door of the Northwestern Hide Com-
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pany building when l(elly-SpringTI.eld Tire Co. built a 
ramp at right ang·les to this building and over the plat-
form, so as to roll tires into trucks and box cars on 
the spur (~-\b. 130-135 ), so it is idle to contend that 
there e\·er was a platform only 10 x 15 feet between 
the spur and the warehouse buildings. As pointed out 
in our original brief, the language in the reservation, 
"about 10 feet wide", obviously refers to the approxi-
mate width of the platform near its easterly portion 
and at the east end of the curve of the spur. This is 
borne out by the sequence of the language of the reser-
vation itself in relation to the actual conditions on the 
ground. Thus, the reservation, after referring to the 
platform as "about 10 feet wide", goes on "including 
the overlapping roof * * *, including also the curve 
thereof along the railway spur etc.'' In following this 
description upon the ground, if one started out at the 
easterly end of the platform and proceeded westerly, 
he would find a platform now approximately seven feet 
wide at its easterly end and in front of the old Scow-
croft building, and then pr.oeeeding westerly, he would 
come to the "overlapping roof," which the Court will 
observe from the pictures in evidence is at the easterly 
end of the Northwestern Hide Company building, and 
just west of the old Scowcroft building, and then pro-
ceeding west the curve of the spur is encountered, just 
in the order recited in the reservation. On the other 
hand, if, the words ''about 10 feet wide'' in the reser-
vation are attempted to be applied to the westerly end 
of the platform ·or its width at such end they neither 
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coincide with the other language of the reservation, with 
the conditions as they existed on the ground, or with the 
testimony of any of the witnesses. As the Court will 
observe fro·m the diagram in respondent's brief, the 
darkly shaded area represents the platform which coun-
sel claim is described in and authorized by the reser-
vation in the deed. If you attempt to follow upon the 
ground the language of the reservation connnencing 
at the westerly end of the claimed platform, you cannot 
do so because the platform at this point is twenty feet or 
n1ore away from the spur track, and it is, therefore, im-
possible to include or follow the spur by proceeding 
to the east, and it is likewise impossible to include the 
overlapping roof which is some distance to the east and 
its westerly edge is a considerable distance from the 
spur. On the other hand, as above pointed out, if you 
follow the language of the reservation ,on the ground 
commencing at or near the easterly end of the platform, 
the roof and the curve of the spur all coincide on the 
ground exactly with the language of the reservation, 
aud in the ,order or sequence there specified. 
Counsel says that if the old platform had been 
''about 10 feet wide'' at its easterly end, it would have 
extended out into the spur. This is obviously not true. 
Upon the diagram in his brief, counsel shows the plat-
form in front of the Sco·wcroft building to be between 
six and seven feet in width. This is a new platform 
whieh replaced an old platform which had originally 
been some two feet wider-such two feet having been 
cut off on the spur side to allow better clearance as 
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te:stified by the witnesses, and hence it appears that 
the old platform at its easterly edge and in front of the 
old Scowcroft building was s01ne nine feet or there-
abouts in width, which certainly qualifies as being'' about 
10 feet wide.'' \Yhen this portion of the ~old original 
platform was in existence, there was no roof over the 
same, and the roof referred to in the reservation is that 
attached to the X orthwestern Hide Company building, 
which, as previously noted, coincides exactly with the 
language of the reservation. 
As the Court will observe from a careful reading of 
the evidence, there were originally and at the time the 
deeds in question were made, two platforms, one on top 
of the other along the north wall of the Hide Company 
building. The lower or so~called basic platform followed 
along the line of the spur as it curved to the north, 
while the other or upper platform, which was built on 
top thereof was straight and extended only in front 
of the two doors of the I-Iide Company building, and 
had a ramp at each end thereof so that the doors of the 
building could be reached with hand trucks from the 
lower or basic platform, which was some two or three 
feet below the level of the doors to the building. To 
the north of the upper platform and ·set in the lower 
platform in front of the west door to the building and 
alongside of the spur were a set of scales upon which 
meat and other products were weighed when unl~oaded 
from cars on the track and transported into the ware-
house building. According to the undisputed evidence, 
these meat trucks, after being weighed on the scales were 
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pushed or pulled along the basic platform to a point 
in front of the rainp, and then pushed or pulled to the 
east up the ramp on to the upper platform and from 
there into the warehouse ( Ah. 120). The location of 
these platforms may he observed in the pictures in 
evidence, which disclose lines or marks plainly evident 
on the Hide Company building showing the exact loca-
tion of these platforms and ramps. 
To have accommodated the upper platform, ramps 
and scales, and to have been used as it admittedly was 
used, the basic platform must have been more than ten 
feet wide and must have come to within a few feet of 
the spur track. The ramp to the upper platform admit-
tedly extended to the west of the west door of the Hide 
Company building. Evidence of its location may be seen 
today on the building, and is shown in the pictures re-
ceived in evidence (Ex. 1, 3, 6; Ah. 92-3). In order to 
have reached this ramp with meat trucks from the scales 
in front or north of the upper platform, the basic plat-
form must have filled in the area between the building 
and the spur track not only to the west door of the 
building, but at least as far west as the westerly end 
of the ramp and some distance beyond in order that 
the meat trucks could be turned around preparatory to 
pushing or pulling them up the ramp. A platform 
only ten feet in width would not have permitted this 
use, .and as there is no dispute in the evidence concern-
ing this use of the platform, it is evident that the same 
must have been of substantially the width claimed by 
appellants and their witnesses. The physical facts and 
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admitted use of the platform bear thi::; out, and the men 
who worked over the platfonn £or more than twenty-five 
year::; testified that it \Yas thirty-two feet wide at its 
westerly end, and the man who tore down the platfonn 
when it was replaced by the concrete testified that it was 
thirty-two feet wide, that he took out and measured 
the stringers which supported the platfonn, and that 
there were two stringers butted end to end, one measur-
ing eighteen feet and the other fourteen feet in length 
(Ab. 103). 
~\s pointed out in our original brief, however, the 
size of the old platform is not of controlling importance. 
Appellants admittedly have the right to maintain a plat-
fonn of some dimensions along the south line of plain-
tiff's property and following the curve of the spur. Ad-
mittedly appellants have and are entitled to easements 
over all of the property south of the spur. This being 
the case, appellants admittedly have not encroached 
upon any of plaintiff's ground over which they did not 
have rights and easements, in the construction of the 
concrete rarnp and paving of which plaintiff complains, 
and the question therefore, is as to whether appellants 
are making any use of this property not within the terms 
of the rights and easements, and which increases the 
burden upon respondent's property and deprives re-
spondent of some use he is entitled to make of this por-
tion of his property. Admittedly the only use appellants 
are making of this property is for the maintenance ,of 
a loading platforrn and to drive over the intervening 
ground to such platform, which are the very uses re-
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spondent admits appellants are entitled to make of this 
property. The point upon which the parties divide con-
cerning the property south of the spur track is not the 
use of the property or the quantity of property which 
appellants are entitled to use, but the manner in which 
it is put to the uses which appellants are admittedly 
entitled to make of it-it being respondent's contention 
that appellants should be limited in driving over and 
traversing the property to driving over level terrain to 
a platform_ with a perpendicular edge instead of over a 
slight incline to the platform itself, which is the manner 
in "-hich the property is used at the present time. 
As we pointed out in our original brief, appellants' 
easements may not be so restricted in the absence of a 
showing that the burden upon respondent's property is 
increased by the manner in which the owners of the ease-
ments are exercising their rights. Although counsel 
assert that the burden is increased by the slight change 
in the level of the terrain so as to back up to the plat-
form level rather than to a perpendicular edge of a 
platform, they neither point to any evidence in the record 
which justifies this assertion, and there is none, nor do 
they show or attempt to show wherein the burden is 
increased by this manner of use. They assert that the 
value of the property has been decreased by this manner 
of use, hut again we observe there is no evidence of any 
decrease in the value of the land. and likewise there is 
no evidence whatsoever that the plaintiff cannot make 
every use of this portion of his property which he could 
make before the ramp was constructed, or if the terrain 
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now covered by the ramp was entirely flat terminating 
at loading platforms of the character that respondent 
claims were there present before the ramp was con-
structed. This being the case, the decree appealed from, 
we submit, is erroneous in requiring removal of the 
ramp, as well as in excluding appellants from the use 
of the team, truck and auto drive north of the spur, and 
for those reasons, as well as for the other reasons dis-
cussed in our original brief, should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HuRD & HuRD, 
:MoYLE, 'RICHARDs & McKAY, 
JuDD, RAY, QurNNEY & NEBEKER, 
Attorneys for Appella;n.ts. 
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